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ABSTRACT
Underground forums where users discuss, buy, and sell illicit ser-
vices and goods facilitate a better understanding of the economy
and organization of cybercriminals. Prior work has shown that
in particular private interactions provide a wealth of information
about the cybercriminal ecosystem. Yet, those messages are seldom
available to analysts, except when there is a leak. To address this
problem we propose a supervised machine learning based method
able to predict which public posts will generate private messages,
after a partial leak of such messages has occurred. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to develop a solution to overcome
the barrier posed by limited to no information on private activity
for underground forum analysis. Additionally, we propose an auto-
mate method for labeling posts, significantly reducing the cost of
our approach in the presence of real unlabeled data. This method
can be tuned to focus on the likelihood of users receiving private
messages, or posts triggering private interactions. We evaluate the
performance of our methods using data from three real forum leaks.
Our results show that public information can indeed be used to
predict private activity, although prediction models do not transfer
well between forums. We also find that neither the length of the
leak period nor the time between the leak and the prediction have
significant impact on our technique’s performance, and that NLP
features dominate the prediction power.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Underground forums facilitate connections between criminals, pro-
viding them with a platform to buy, sell, and trade illicit goods
and services, such as stolen information, account hacking services,
and hacking tools. These forums also enable cybercriminals to dis-
cuss illicit topics and share information, providing an ecosystem in
which criminals can decompose large tasks, such as profiting from
spam [17], into smaller subtasks that individuals or organizations
can focus on solving [23]. Much like in the legitimate business
world, this subdividing of responsibilities results in increased effi-
cacy and innovation.
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Understanding structure of these forums is essential to compre-
hending the cybercriminal pipeline and how these organizations
and individuals behave [23]. This has been the focus of signifi-
cant research [11, 13, 18, 23] as well as several industrial “threat
intelligence” firms which study cybercriminal forums in order to
sell information about emerging attacks and threats. For instance,
monitoring of these forums has revealed massive data leaks from
Target [15] and Yahoo [19]. Analysis of private parts of the forums
have led to making connections which exposed groups of colluding
underground forum members [16].
Previous studies of these forums have shown that while public
messages are primarily used to advertise goods and services, pri-
vate messages are a stronger indicator of potential transactions [18].
Thus, studying the private interactions is crucial to fully understand
the underlying economy. However, such study has so far been only
possible for a few cybercriminal forums for which private messages
have been publicly leaked. These leaks are rare and only provide
a snapshot of the forum. Thus, they cannot be considered a con-
tinuous source of information about private communications. To
address the problem that the absence of private messages leaks
poses to forum analysts, in this paper we explore methods to infer
the existence of private interactions based on information that is
publicly available. We first show that the graph of people commu-
nicating privately has little overlap with the graph derived from
public interactions. Thus, the public interactions cannot be used to
directly infer details about private messages. Instead, we propose a
method using supervised learning to predict if a public post will
result in a private interaction using the content of the posts and
metadata about both the user who created the post and the post
itself as features.
We evaluate our approach on three underground forums for
which we have the leaked private message data as well as public
posts for the same time period. Our results show that our method
performs significantly better than random. We find that metadata
features contain a lot of predictive power individually, however, in
aggregate, features related to a post’s content make these content-
based features more influential in classification. Our results show
that neither the length of the leak period nor the time between the
leak and the prediction have significant impact on our technique’s
performance, suggesting that activity in the forum is stable over
time. Finally, we also find that for the prediction of private inter-
actions to be useful, some training data from the target forum is
required. Our methods are useful for analysts to triage a forum and
focus additional investigations on likely interesting public posts.
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Determining the ground truth of which private messages are
related to a public post is not only very costly, but also difficult to
conclude evenwhen performedmanually.We address this challenge
by developing amethod of automatically determining the likelihood
that a private message is related to a public post. For each post we
then sum these likelihoods and take this sum to label the likelihood
that the post has an associated private reply during the leak in
which we possess both private and public messages. This method is
not only useful for reducing the amount of effort required to train
our technique on new forums, but also mitigates the difficulty of
hand labeling which private messages are replies to public posts.
Our automated labeling has as input a parameter Θ that tunes the
threshold for determining if a post is labeled as positive or negative.
This inherently affects which features are prioritized: those related
to the post initiator (Θ = 0), or characteristics of the post itself (high
Θ). Our manual evaluation confirms that high values of Θ focus the
labeler on private messages sent close to the post publication time,
thus highly likely to be related to it, whereas when the Θ parameter
is low, (i.e., it uses any message received by the user), the labeler
detects whether the user is likely to receive private messages in
general, independent of any particular post.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
✓We provide the first analysis of the relation between pub-
lic and private communications in Underground forums.We
show that there is little overlap between the private graph of peo-
ple communicating in private and the public graph derived from
public posts. Less than 3% of the users that communicate in public
exchange private messages, and roughly 50% of the users that com-
municate in private ever commented together on a public post. We
conclude that there is no straightforward relation between public
and private communications in underground forums.
✓We develop a supervised machine learning based method
to predict which public posts are likely to trigger private
messages. Our experiments show that the AUC of our classifier
ranges from 0.65—0.77, depending on the parameters, when training
and testing is performed on the same forum. The AUC decreases to
0.60 when testing in another forum. Also, our feature analysis con-
cludes that the content of the post has better predictive power than
its metadata, even though the latter still encode a lot of information
regarding the likelihood of receiving a response.
✓We model the delay distribution of private messages sent
to a user after they create a public post.We observe a spike in
the volume of private messages sent to a public post creator that
degrades at an exponential rate within a few hours of the publishing
of the post. We model the distribution of this delay as a mixture of
exponentials and estimate its parameters, fitting this function to the
delays of the incoming messages for each leak on each forum. This
distribution allows us to determine the likelihood that a private
message is related to a public post.
✓Wedevelop amethod for automatically labeling posts that
are likely to trigger private messages. This method assigns
weights to posts to express the uncertainty of the relation between
posts and private messages observed in manual labeling. We per-
form some manual validation by labeling pairs of posts and private
messages sent the the post creator. We find that when we look
at posts that were labeled negative by our labeler that 83% of the
sampled privates messages were not related to the post.
2 RELATEDWORK
We provide a brief overview of related work on forum analysis and
predictive machine learning.
2.1 Underground Forum Analysis
Initial studies of underground forums showed that cybercriminals
with specialized skills cooperate and trade different products and
services [10, 11, 18, 24]. Thus, analyses of these forums can be used
to understand how these criminals interact with each other and
what goods and services are exchanged [23]. Prior research has
aimed to understand why cybercriminals organize by either analyz-
ing private messages [2, 3, 26], or evaluating self reported studies
of members of these communities [13]. Most of this prior research
based parts of their analysis or evaluation on private information
from forum leaks.
Additional research on private messages focuses on how these
forums are able to remain operational. Afroz et al. [3] argued that
trust management on underground forums is similar to sustaining
a common pool resource. However, the success of markets does not
indicate the success of individual criminals or vice-versa. Individual
criminals have a higher probability of pay-off contingent on their
ability to interpret market signals of quality (of both goods/services
and individuals selling/buying the same [6]. As a result, a cyber-
criminal’s ability to succeed or make profits may depend on their lo-
cation in the network, which is measured by centrality. Individuals
with high betweenness centrality have access to more information
both quantitatively and in terms of diversity [5], while individuals
with higher degree centrality (for private messages) received more
responses for public posts on Carders [18]. For example, examina-
tion of Russian malware writers noted that individuals with higher
technical skills were more centrally located [13]. Simultaneously,
Dupont examined a co-offending network of 10 cybercriminals
and noted that the more popular criminal did not control the most
botnets [7]. From an enforcement perspective, focusing on degree
central criminals is efficient in the former case but not in the latter.
Examining the correlation between various centrality measures
on underground forums would illuminate the structural proper-
ties of the market and thereby inform deterrence measures [25].
Thus, the centrality of a cybercriminal may influence their ability
to succeed or make profits. This type of analysis, however, cannot
be completed without a leak of the private messages. Our proposed
method could potentially enable some of this analysis for longer
periods of time based training data from earlier forum leaks.
2.2 Predictive Machine Learning
Several prior studies that have used machine learning to predict
a future event. The EMBERS system forecasts civil unrest using
open source indicators [8]. Predicting if a vulnerable website will be
compromised and turn malicious based on the if the vulnerability
is being commonly exploited and the profile of the website [22].
Predicting if an organization will suffer a data breach based on
their externally observable security profile and properties of the
organization that might make them a more attractive target [9].
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Our method using similar methods of publicly observable infor-
mation to infer and predict private interactions that are useful for
understanding cybercriminal forums.
Machine learning approaches have also been explored, among
others, to predict reversions, promotions, and downvotes of user-
generated content in web-based communities such as Slashdot [4]
and Wikipedia [14, 21]. These approaches have shown that user
reputation features and contextual metadata are useful in these
systems. The best of our knowledge, our method is the first attempt
to tackle this difficult problem of predicting which public posts will
generate private interactions.
3 PREDICTING PRIVATE INTERACTIONS
3.1 Problem statement
Let us consider a forum in which N users u1, . . . ,un communicate
with each other. A userui can perform the following actions: publish
a post, reply to a post, or send a private message to a user uj . The
two former are public, i.e., observable by anyone that has access to
the forum, while the latter are private, i.e., only observable to the
sender and receiver of the private message.
While private messages are usually private, they are sometimes
made public via so-called leaks of the forum database [1]. Such
leaks consist of information about the forum users as well as posts,
replies, and private messages during a period of time. We denote
the time when the leak starts as tl , and the duration of the leak
period as dl .
Our goal is to gain understanding on whether the leaked infor-
mation, i.e., users, post, replies, and private messages between tl
and tl + dl , can be used to predict future private interactions in a
forum. More formally, given a post posti (tp ) published by ui at
time tp > tl + dl , we aim to predict whether there will be a future
private interaction msg∗,i (tm ), tm > tp , with user ui as receiver.
3.2 Approach
A straightforward approach to answer the above question would be
to use information from the public graph, i.e., who communicates
with whom in public, to infer which users communicate in private.
However, a preliminary analysis of the available underground fo-
rums leaks immediately shows that private and public graphs are
far from being related.
Less than 5% of users that participate in the same public thread
ever communicate in private. Figure 1 shows the overlap of connec-
tions made in private versus public for every connection observed
during the forum leaks. For all forums, at most 3% of connections
made from one user to another in private also occur in public. On
Carders, the forum with the highest number of private messages
proportional to the public interactions, if we only look at the users
that do communicate in private, we see that, roughly, only 50% of
them ever commented at the same public thread at some point over
the entire length of the leak.
These results suggest that the relation between public and private
interactions is much more complex. To address this complexity,
we frame the question of inferring private communication as a
supervised machine learning problem. Assume there is a leak with
both public and private interactions over a leak period between tl
and tl + dl of duration dl , and that the goal is to predict private
interactions during a target period (tt , tt +dt ) of durationdt , strictly
distinct from the leak period, for which we only have access to
public information. Figure 2 illustrates this timeline. The parameter
∆ denotes the time passed since the end of the leak period and the
start of the target period.
The public and private data available from the leak period can
be used as a training set to build a modelM that represents the
likelihood that a user receives a private message after publishing
a post. This model uses as features public information about a
post posti (tp ) (e.g., characteristics of the sender ui , number of to
the post replies, post content) published in the target period. The
prediction performance greatly depends on the features used to
train the model. We provide examples of feature sets, and evaluate
their performance, in Section 4.
3.3 Automating labeling
Note that the available leaks do not contain explicit information
about public-private messages correspondence. Thus, one challenge
in this problem is that there is no ground truth linking private
messages to public threads. Even with all of the leaked information
available it is unclear which private messages are related to which
public posts or even if a public post received any replies.
One option to solve this problem would be to manually label the
data. This would mean going through each of the posts published
in the leak period and searching through the private messages
for related conversations. This process is not only prohibitively
expensive, but also difficult. Manual linking must be evaluated
in terms of content and in many cases, even for a human, the
relationship between public posts is not always clear, hindering the
labeling task. As an example, we did manually label a small set of
330 posts and message pairs with the goal of determining if they
were related. We ended up labeling almost half, 47%, as unclear.
Section 4 further details this analysis.
Thus, we develop a method to automatically label posts in the
training set. Acknowledging that the relation between posts and
private messages is fuzzy, and that as a result labels will be noisy,
our method does not use binary yes/no labels but assigns a weight
to each post. This weight effectively models the post likelihood of
having triggered a private message.
As a first step, we aim to model the relationship between the
time when a user ui publishes a public post, posti (tp ), and when
she receives a private message msg∗,i (tm ). We denote this time
difference as τx and compute it as τx = tm,x − tp , where x indicates
the index of subsequent messages received by the post initiator in
increasing order (see Figure 3).
To this end we compute the distribution of intervals τ for all
posts and private mesages in the leak period. The results are shown
in Figure 4 for the three forums we use in our experiments. In
this figure each bar represents the volume of incoming messages in
intervals of 15minutes across the entirety of a leak period of 6weeks.
We observe a large spike shortly after a post is published, which we
conjecture is generated by a large amount of messages triggered by
such post. Note that users also receive messages when they have
not recently posted, as indicated by the long tails of the distribution.
Negative values of τ are a result of private messages received prior
to a given post publication that can be either responses to previous
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92.63%
7.37%
0.01%
L33tCrew
21.04% 78.96%
0.03%
Carders
Public Connections Private Connections
65.36% 34.64%
0.03%
Nulled
Figure 1: Similarity of private and public connections. In this analysis a public connection is made from ui to uj when a ui
comments in a post created by uj , and a private connection is made from ui to uj when ui sends a private message to uj .
• • • •
tl
dl
tl + dl ∆ tt
dt
tt + dt
Figure 2: Leak period (tl , tl + dl ) of duration dl and target
period (tt , tt + dt ) of duration dt separated by a time ∆.
• • • •
posti (tp )
τ1
msgi,∗(tm,1)
τ2
msgi,∗(tm,2)
τ3
msgi,∗(tm,3)
Figure 3: Timing relationship between posting, tp , and pri-
vate messages received by the post creator at tm,1, tm,2, and
tm,3.
posts or spontaneous messages between users. We recall that in
this paper we are only interested in predicting messages sent after
a post and therefore in the reminder of this document we disregard
negative values of τ .
To represent both behaviors, the spike after publication and the
low posterior influx, we model the likelihood of a given arrival time
of incoming private messages to a user after a post as a mixture of
two exponentials:
f (x) = a1e−b1x + a2e−b2x (1)
The first exponential, defined by coefficients a1 and b1, aims at
capturing the initial steep decline, while the one defined by a2 and
b2 captures the slow decay in the number of messages over time.
The value of these coefficients can be estimated by interpolating
the function f (x) over the data points from the training data ob-
tained in the leak period. Note, however, that Figure 4 also shows
the existence of a continuous flow of messages independent of
the existence of the post (distribution tail). We model this post-
independent message flow as a constant c . Then, instead of directly
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Figure 4: Distribution of intervals τ between post publica-
tion and reception of private messages for each forum over
a leak of size six weeks.
interpolating f (x), we interpolate f (x) + c from which can easily
obtain f (x) by substracting the constant. We measure how well
the interpolation fits to the data by computing the coefficient of
determination R2 = 1−(∑i (yi − y¯)2/(∑i (yi − fi (x))2)where each
yi is the volume of incoming messages at time i .
The values of the coefficients obtained via interpolation depend
on three parameters. Naturally, on the duration of the leak period,
dl , that determines the number of posts and private messages avail-
able to construct the histogram that we use as input to interpolation.
Secondly, they depend on the maximum time τmax after a post for
which a private message is considered to be possibly related to this
post. This not only affects the number of private messages available,
but also the weight of the distribution tail on the interpolation prob-
lem. To avoid setting this value arbitrarily, we infer it empirically by
testing values for τmax and choosing the one for which the values
of the coefficients do not change more than 10e − 3 when it is in-
creased. We stress that, though we cap τ for the interpolation, f (x)
is not truncated so as to indicate that any message in the future
could be related to a post, though the likelihood is very small.
Finally, the values of the coefficients depend on the granularity
used to compute the histogram representing the distribution. In
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Figure 5: Distribution of τ values and f (x) + c for L33tCrew.
(dl = 7 weeks, τmax = 15 hours, bucket_averaдe = 4, R2 =
0.939561)
Figure 4 time is arbitraritly divided in 15-minute bins for τ . For
our experiments, we explored a few methods for determining the
optimal granularity of the distribution. The naïve method is to
choose, as in Figure 4 fix the bin size for any length of the leak
period dl . This method is harmful for smaller leaks, since the bins
are too small and many end up empty providing a poor input to
the interpolation. Instead, we developed a balanced method that
determines the bin granularity based on the average number of
items desired in each bucket. This method ensures that one has
enough quality data points for interpolation, i.e., all bins have a
significant number of points, regardless of the duration leak and
the level of activity in the forum.
We tested both of these methods with a number of inputs, and
compared the obtained R2 values. As expected, the smaller leaks
saw the greatest improvement with the balanced method, with a
dl of one week improving from R2 = 0.50 for one minute bins, and
R2 = 0.83 for five minutes bins, to R2 = 0.96 with the balanced
method with an average of five items per bucket. We show in
Figure 5 the result of the interpolation for L33tCrew.
Since the function f (x) models the likelihood of a private mes-
sage being sent to a post creator after the thread has been created,
it can be used to infer a label that represents the core question in
this paper: will a user who posts a public post receive a private
message? For this purpose, we define the aggregated likelihood
that a given post posti (tp ) sent by user ui receives a response as:
Lposti (tp ) =
∑
f (τx ), ∀τx = tm,x − tp , (2)
such that tm,x > tp and there exists a private message msg∗,i (tm,x )
to ui at that time.
The above definition of the likelihood closely resembles that of
the joint probability. However, we note that f (x) is not a proba-
bility distribution, thus nor is Lposti (tp ). First, f (x) is fitted to the
volume of τ observed in the training dataset, thus it is possible that
the area under the curve does not add up to 1. Normalizing after
the interpolation to transform f (x) into a distribution is also not
possible given that the support for the exponential goes to infinity.
Once the aggregated likelihood is computed, we assign a binary
label to posts using a threshold Θ ∈ {0, . . . ,∞} to decide whether
the post has generated messages, or not. When Θ = 0, i.e., when
we evaluate that Lposti (tp ) > 0, posts initiated by a user who ever
receives a message during the leak period are labeled positively.
When Θ is large positive labels are only assigned to those posts for
which the initiator receives a message close to the time of the post
publication. Thus, this threshold effectively balances whether the
labeling focuses on the overall likelihood of the user receiving a
message or on the likelihood of the particular post evaluated having
triggered the private interaction, as we demonstrate in Section 4.2.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Experimental setup
In this section we describe the conditions in which we carry out
the evaluation of our prediction method. We introduce the datasets
we use and describe the preprocessing we perform prior to the
experiments, as well as the machine learning tools that we use to
implement the predictor.
Datasets. We evaluate this method on three leaked underground
forums: Carders (CC), L33tCrew (LC), and Nulled(NL). All three
forums were leaked anonymously, are publicly available, and have
been used in several academic [2, 3, 18, 20] as well as non-academic1
studies. We describe each forum below and we summarize their
characteristics in Table 1.
• L33tCrew is a German language carding forum specializing in
trading stolen credit and debit cards. It was started in May 2007
and was leaked and closed in Nov 2009. At the time of the leak,
L33tCrew had 18,834 total members, 7,687 of them participated
in private message interaction. After the leak many members of
L33tCrew joined Carders.
• Carders is a similar German language carding forum. Carders
was established in February 2009 and was leaked and closed in
December 20102. At the time of the leak, Carders had 8,425 to-
tal members among which 4,290 members participated in private
message interaction.
• Nulled is a large English language forum covering a large
variety of topics and is currently still active. At the time of the leak
Nulled had 599,085 members. However, only 6.11% (36,606) of the
users in the leak sent or received private messages.
Forum Language Dates Users Users w/ PMs
LC German 05/07-11/09 18834 7687
CC German 02/09-12/10 8425 4290
NL English 01/15-05/16 599085 36606
Table 1: Forums leaked data
Though all of these forums are generally similar in content and
structure, the way that users interact with each of them varies. In
every forum, users can create public threads, submit a comment
to an existing thread, or send a private message to another user.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of these interactions over time for
1http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/carders-cc/
2Details of carders leak: http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/15823/
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all forums. Nulled has the largest activity volume as well as a higher
percentage of comments compared the posts and messages, while
L33tCrew has a relatively higher proportion of private messages.
Carders hasmuch less activity than the other two, but a high volume
of private interactions.
Data Pre-Processing. First we select posts that are created in
isolation of other posts by the same user. That is, if ui creates
two posts within 12 hours of each other both are discarded. This
ensures that, in training we are properly labeling the replies that
correspond to that thread, and in testing we can correctly evaluate
post classification inequivocally. Since the post publication times
are known to the analyst this is a plausible assumption to make. For
training we also remove posts that are within 24 hours of the end
of dl . The rationale is that most private replies to these posts may
come after dl and are therefore unknown by definition causing the
post to be mislabeled increasing the false negative rate. After the
post filtering step, we select chunks of varying length dl to simulate
forum leaks that we use for training, as well as non-overlapping
chunks of fixed length dt that we use for testing, as discussed below.
Features & Classifier. We show in Table 2 the features we use
to create the modelsM we use for classification. We include both
natural language and post context features. The post context include
timing, tags, public replies tags, as well as user-related features.
Among the latter we include centrality metrics from the public
interaction graph, i.e., the graph that links post creators to post
respondents. These centrality features have been shown in previous
work [12] to be a measure of users’ popularity and influence on
these forums. We run experiments with just the natural language
features, just the context features, and all of the features. Note that
for the natural language features we remove function words and
use the frequency of the stems of the remaining words.
Feature Type Description
Natural Language title bag of words, thread bag of words, and
subforum name bag of words
Context tagged sell post, tagged buy post, time,
time on forum, reply count, user reputation,
views, and graph centrality metrics for the
post creator: clustering, degree, eigenvec-
tor, betweenness
Table 2: Summary of the feature set used for classification.
We train a Random Forest Classifier on each of the feature groups.
We choose random forest for classification for three primary rea-
sons. First, outliers are common in our data set, and are common in
data of this type generally. Second, the results are easily interpreted.
That is, we can easily discover which features the decisions are
made on. Finally, random forest classifiers are not as susceptible
to overfitting as other similar classification techniques, which is
particularly important in this problem as the training data and
testing data are coming from a different time slice of the forum.
Throughout our experiments we vary the classification threshold
of the random forest classifier in order to create ROC curves that
represent the performance of our prediction.
Simulation parameters. To explore different scenarios, in our sim-
ulations we vary several parameters from our model, see Section 3.
First, we vary the size of the leak, dl ∈ [1, 3, 5, 7]. Smaller leaks
have less posts to train the model, and also less known private
messages to use to infer the labeling function f (x). For simplicity
and comparability we fix the span of the testing period, dt . We
empirically determined that a span of six weeks contained enough
data to obtain smooth ROC curves resistant to noise. Additionally,
fixing dt allows us to accurately test ∆, the time between the leak
and the testing periods. Otherwise, varying dt would affect the
average time between the training and the testing posts accross
experiments. We also vary ∆ to evaluate the effect of time passing
between the leak and testing periods. In the bulk of our experiments
we use ∆ ∈ [0, 3, 5] weeks. Since understanding how these forums
change over time affects performance is vital to evaluate how well
our method scales, we use an additional ∆ ∈ [10, 20, 30, 40, 50] for
L33tCrew, the forum with the longest leak.
Finally, we also vary the value of Θ to evaluate the performance
of our method when it focuses on user-only features – Θ = 0,
i.e., posts receive positive labels if the user ever receives a private
message after posting); and when more weight is given to Post-
oriented features – high Θ, i.e., posts receive positive labels when
the initiator receives private messages close in time to the thread.
4.2 Results
Random Forest Classifier results. First, we study the influence of
dl and ∆ have on the accuracy of our prediction methods. We show
the results in Figure 7 where for each combination of dl and ∆ we
plot the results for the largest possible Θ for which the percentage
of positive labels is greater than 10%. This ensures that: i) we do
not focus on user-based features that are stable over time, and
ii) there is enough data in the positive class for the classification
performance to be significant. We observe that varying dl , or ∆ has
no notable effect on the accuracy. Even with the larger values of ∆
tested on the L33tCrew forum we see no decline in accuracy: ∆ = 5
and ∆ = 40 yielded an accuracy of 87.17% and 81.41%. For the rest
of the experiments in this section we fix dl to 7 weeks and ∆ to 0.
We then study the effect ofΘ on performance.We plot in Figure 8
ROC curves for varying Θ. We see that across all three forums, and
in particular for Carders, smaller values of Θ where more posts are
labeled as positive perform best, i.e. they result a higher True Posi-
tive Rate and a lower False Positive Rate. We conjecture that part of
this success is due to small Θ yielding a large percentage of positive
labels, thus resulting in a more balanced training distribution.
Finally, we compare the different feature sets, see Figure 9. All
of the features together perform the best, followed closely by only
NLP. Both of them clearly outperform the context features alone.
The context features are most useful on Carders, and on both Nulled
and Carders they do better with a smaller Θ than a larger one. This
supports our claim that when Θ is set to 0 that what is being pre-
dicted is closer to which users are more likely to receive messages
rather than which posts are likely to trigger private replies.
Manual validation of labeling.We manually labeled 330 public
post and private message pairs. We sampled these posts and then
we selected uniformly at random one message that was sent to
the post creator at any time in dl = 16 weeks. We then labeled
whether the private message appeared to be in response to the post.
Of the 330 pairs we were able to conclusively label 175. Note that,
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Figure 6: Type of activity over the time of the leaks for all forums.
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Figure 7: Classification accuracy for different values of dl and ∆ using all features.
Figure 8: ROC Curves for different Θ values (dl = 7 weeks and ∆ = 0).
as opposed to our automated labeling method, this manual labeling
does not aim at establishing if a post received any related private
message, but whether a post created by ui and a concrete private
message sent to ui were related. Therefore, we could not expect
our manual labels to fully line up with the automated labels even
if both methods output perfect labels. We also label posts in the
manually labeled pairs using our automated labeler for Θ = 0 and
Θ = 90.
Table 3 displays the results of both labeling processes. Note that
when Θ = 0, i.e., when automated labeling assigns a positive label
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Figure 9: ROC Curves for different feature sets (dl = 7 weeks and ∆ = 0)
to each post creator who receives a private message in dl , there are
no negatively labeled posts for which we can label a public post
and private message pair because there are no positively labeled
posts with private messages. That is, if we are labeling a pair with
a private message to ui , there is at least one message in dl , thus the
label is positive by default.
Θ Automated Manual Percent
0 + + 32.93%
+ - 67.07%
90 + + 46.15%
+ - 53.85%
90 - + 17.07%
- - 82.93%
Table 3: Results of manual and automated labeling. Auto-
mated labeling configured with Θ = 0 and Θ = 90.
We see that for posts labeled positively by the automated method
with Θ = 0 about a third of the sampled privates messages are
manually labeled as related. The fact that manual labeling finds
many of the posts with positive labels to have unrelated messages
indicates that, indeed, the automated labeler is not focusing on the
post itself, but to the user. Also, we note that the posts that were
manually labeled as unrelated may have a private message different
from the sampled one that is actually related to the post, so the
automated label may still be correct.
When we increase Θ to 90, the number of posts labeled as nega-
tive increases: users that receive their messages far after the post
will be labeled as negative, as these messages are unlikely to be
related to the post and thus contribute little to Lposti (tp ), see 2,
which does not reach the threshold Θ = 90. On posts that the auto-
mated method labeled as negative, we manually label 17% of our
pairs as related. That is, this automated labeler mislabeled these
posts according to our manual labeling.
For the posts that our automated method labels as positive, there
is a difference between the posts labeled with Θ = 90 and Θ = 0.
The higher percentage of pairs being manually labeled as positive
for a larger Θ implies that a larger Θ is more likely to have a related
private message than a smaller Θ. Thus, Θ tunes the model to be
more or less related to the post itself, or to be tuned to whether a
user generally receives many messages.
Figure 10, where we plot the distribution of τ values for positively
labeled posts, supports this claim. We observe that for Θ = 0 the
volume of messages at small τ is smaller than for other Θ, but
larger for large τ . In other words, large Θ considers a much larger
percentage of private messages sent closer to the Post publication
time, and therefore likely to be related to it. On the other hand small
Θ consider messages all across dl , i.e., considers only whether the
message has been sent to the target receiver regardless of the time.
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Figure 10: Distributions of τ values for Positive Labels on
L33tCrew. (dl = 7 weeks, ∆ = 0)
Feature Analysis. Next we aim to determine which features are
the best predictors, for which we calculate the information gain
at each experiment. Surprisingly, we find that the highest ranked
features in most experiments are the centrality metrics, number
of public replies, number of views, and how long the user has
been on the forum. We observe no notable difference between
the top ranked features for different values of Θ. This seem to
contradict the results of the Random Forest Classifier which show
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that performance is better using the NLP features. This discrepancy
is due to the volume of these features. Though context features
contain a lot of information and individually are very predictive,
they are only a handful. On the other hand, we have thousands of
NLP features, thus they are more predictive as an ensemble.
Cross-Forum Classification Here we consider the case where the
analyst wants to predict private activity on a forum for which she
has no leaked data, but a similar forum exists with leaked private
message data. We take as examples L33tCrew and Carders since
they are the most similar forums considered in this work, both
being German language carding forums. We train the classifier on
data from Carders and test it on data from L33tCrew. The results
are displayed in Figure 11. While the classifier does outperform
random chance, the results are, predictably, worse than the intra-
forum results presented above.
Figure 11: Cross Forum Results for L33tCrew and Carders.
5 DISCUSSION
Limitations. The accuracy of our method is not exceptionally high,
meaning that its results cannot be used to directly act upon a post
or user. However, we have found that predicting private activity is
a difficult problem and even manual analysis often cannot ascertain
if a private message was sent in response to public posts. Thus,
providing analysts with automated tools to point out where to
concentrate their efforts is of value.
Another key limitation of our method is that, though it is quite
effective at predicting which posts will be followed by private in-
teractions, it cannot predict who will participate in the private
communication. Such a graph would be useful for understanding
collaborations among members and their relations. However, the
revelation of our analysis that there is little overlap between mem-
bers whom post in the same public post and those whom commu-
nicate privately hints that inferring such graph is a very complex
problem.
Also, our analysis has focused on ‘isolated’ posts, i.e., posts for
which the poster does not start any other post in within 12 hours.
While this simplification still allows us to show that private inter-
actions can indeed be predicted, it limits the applicability of our
approach. More research is needed to develop means to jointly
infer the likelihood of responses when a series of posts are pub-
lished, and to devise whether it is possible to decide which of these
public communications has, or have, actually triggered the private
interaction.
Finally, we observe that, although our technique outperforms
random guessing when trained on one forum and tested on another
forum, it currently performs better when there is training data
for the target forum. This lays out an interesting problem to be
addressed in future work, focused on how to identify stable features
that can be used to bridge the difference in domains posed by the
diversity between different forums’ users.
Use Cases. Even though our approach has several limitations
there are useful and realistic use cases. The first envisioned use
case is for forums such as Nulled, where it continues to operate
after the forum leak. Researchers or private companies could con-
tinue collating the public messages from Nulled or another forum
that continued operating after a leak. Researchers or analysts can
use our approach to identify public posts that likely generated pri-
vate interactions. This could enable measures of forum member
centrality based on private interaction or identify members and
public posts that should be further examined based on likely private
interactions which might indicate completed sales.
Ethics. All of the data used in our study was publicly leaked
and believed to be authentic. Our IRB deemed our study exempt
based on the fact that the data was publicly leaked and that by
the nature of the data being underground criminal forums it is
unlikely anyone used their real name or other Personal Identifiable
Information (PII). Our analysis of private messages was focused
on identifying links between private messages and posts, and not
analyzing users identities or messages content. If we had discovered
PII in these messages we would have notified our IRB and submitted
an amended IRB application. However, we did not find any PII
during our manual analysis.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Private activity in underground forums has been shown to be key
for understanding the underlying cybercriminal ecosystem. How-
ever, analysts rarely have access to private messages and when they
do these private interactions are limited to a snapshot that only
represents forum activity during a bounded time interval.
In this work we propose and evaluate a method that provides
analysts with the means to predict such private interactions from
the information that is available to them. We have presented a
supervised machine learning based method able to predict which
public posts will generate private messages, after a partial leak
of such messages has occurred. Additionally, we have proposed a
method for automated labeling that reduces the cost of our analysis,
thus increasing its potential to be deployed to analyze large forums.
This automatic labeling method has a parameter This is especially
useful as manual labeling turned out to be even more difficult than
expected.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first proposed
to tackle this important underground forum analysis problem of
limited to no information about private interactions in most un-
derground forums. Our work is an initial step to provide forum
analysts with tools to understand which posts are likely result in
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sales or follow up discussion and are more likely important for
them to spend more time investigating. Understanding how this
learning problem transfers across forums is a crucial part of future
work in this area.
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